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As society becomes increasingly aware of the fact that 
hiring practices have been discriminatory against women, 
various solutions have been offered to rectify the situation. 
One such solution is preferential hiring, specifically of 
women who are less qualified than white males who apply for 
the job. In this way reparations could be made to women 
applicants as a matter of compensatory justice. 
Many normative and even philosophical questions are 
raised by such preferential hiring. Should such preferen-
tial hiring apply only to women who have been discriminated 
against in past hiring situations, or to all women? Even 
though many women have never been discriminated against in 
a hiring situation, the vast majority of women are exposed 
to discrimination which may have hindered the development 
of their job qualifications. Should women be compensated 
for all forms of discrimination by preferential hiring? 
Since other groups of people in our society have been dis-
criminated against in the past, do not they deserve such 
preferential hiring as well? If preferential hiring is to 
be regarded as compensation for past discrimination, who 
should be making the compensation, all employers or those 
who·have practiced discrimination in the past? Are the 
employers or- are the white male applicants actually the 
ones making the compensation? "The central questions remain 
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whether, when and in what sense compensation can be owed to 
a group as a whole, whether ••• women qualify as the proper 
kind of group." (Goldman, 1975: 292) 
Initially, compensatory preferential hiring may seem 
to be the obvious solution to a history of discriminatory 
hiring practices. Upon closer observations, one discovers 
that such preferential hiring may result in causing more 
problems than it solves. I shall argue that compensatory 
preferential hiring is unjustified, and I shall argue this 
by refuting the main arguments for preferential hiring. In 
addition, I shall refute the narrowest claims for compensa-
tory preferential hiring first and, then, as the claims for 
preferential hiring broaden in scope, so shall my arguments 
against these claims. 
It should be noted at this point the boundaries of the 
issue which I shall consider. Hereafter when I speak of 
preferential hiring, I shall be referring only to compensa-
~ preferential hiring. Additionally, hereafter it shall 
be assumed that the female applicant meets the threshold of 
adequate competence. 
There are arguments for preferential hiring which have 
not been considered, such as utilitarian arguments for the 
lessened tensions within society, other teleological argu-
ments for the increased self-esteem of women, and free-market 
arguments for increasing the quality of the applicant pool 
in the long run. This paper addresses only the arguments 
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for preferential hiring insofar as it is a matter of compen-
satory justice. 
* * * * * 
It has been argued that the mere fact that a person is 
a woman is sufficient ground for her to deserve preferential 
hiring as a matter of compensatory justice. Of course, some 
claim such preferential hiring perpetuates injustice because 
it continues to use morally irrelevant grounds for special 
advantages. To counter this claim, the argument is offered 
that preferential hiring advantages are not given on morally 
irrelevant grounds (i.e. being a woman), but are given on 
morally relevant grounds (i.e. having been discriminated 
against in the past). The characteristic of being a woman 
has become morally relevant because it was the ground upon 
which the woman was discriminated against in the past. (Taylor, 
1973) Originally the principles of distributive justice were 
violated because the woman was discriminated against on morally 
irrelevant grounds. However, based upon the principle of com-
pensatory justice, "which applies only when a violation of 
other forms of justice has taken place," the fact that a per-
son is a woman is made morally relevant for purposes of resti-
tution because it was on that basis alone that she was dis-
criminated against originally. (Taylor, 1973: 179-180) 
This argument works only in the cases where a woman who 
has been discrimiiia.ted against in a hiring situation in the 
past is the one receiving compensation. Otherwise the 
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principles of compensatory justice do not apply because there 
has been no injury to the woman. That is to say that being a 
woman did not become a morally relevant factor because that 
factor was not the basis for· any prior discrimination in a 
hiring situation. Thus, for those women who have not been 
discriminated against in the past in a hiring situation, the 
fact that they are women is still morally irrelevant. Often 
in instances of preferential hiring, those women who were 
injured by the initial discrimination are not the same women 
as those who benefit from preferential hiring. "Because of 
this, preferential hiring is said to be both irrelevant to 
the aim of compensating for past injustices and unfair to 
those whose superior qualifications are by-passed." (Sher, 
1979: 81} 
For compensatory justice there must be "a perfect corre-
lation" between the members of a group now preferred and those 
people who have been discriminated against. "But although 
discrimination against minority groups has been widespread, 
I do not believe that any of the present generation groups 
usually singled out for reverse discrimination can support 
this drastic a claim." (Goldman, 1975: 294) In reply to 
this comment, the argument has been made, "If this is the 
only practical way to help a group, the vast majority of 
which fully deserves compensation, that objection would only 
be grudging." (Boxill, 1978: 25) Yet one must question if 
the "vast majority" of women has been discriminated against 
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in a hiring situation. Plainly, preferential hiring cannot 
be justified as compensation for the group of women as a whole. 
To further support this claim one may look at the socio-
logical definition of a group which states that there must be 
interaction between the members and members must play certain 
reciprocal roles. Viewing groups in this sociological sense, 
compensatory justice may be justified in that a group has been 
directly disadvantaged by discrimination against one or more 
of its members. The member has an integral role in the group 
as a whole. However, since each woman does not interact with 
every other woman and does not possess an integral role with-
in the group, discrimination does not injure the group. Thus 
preferential hiring should compensate the individual who was 
discriminated against in a hiring situation, but not the group 
of women as a whole. (Goldman, 1975) In effect, compensa-
tion should be determined by the history of discrimination 
against the particular applicant, not by the sex of the in-
jured party. (Boxill, 1975) 
One may argue that even though not every woman has ex-
perienced discrimination when applying for a job, most women 
have experienced discrimination in some manner which has been 
detrimental to her job skills. Yet there are different levels 
of discrimination to which each woman is exposed, so it is 
impossible to determine how much each woman should be compen-
sated. Further, even if it could be determined how much her 
skills had been affected, and it was determined that, but for 
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the discrimination, she would have been on the same level as 
the white male applicant, the person who has made the effort 
to develop her skills deserves more than the person who would 
have made the effort if he had been discriminated against. 
(Sher, 1975) 
Most importantly, even assuming that every woman has 
been discriminated against in a manner that has been detri-
mental to the development of her job skills, the single, all-
encompassing compensation of preferential hiring is unjusti-
fied. If preferential hiring is to be viewed as compensation 
for past discrimination, then the reparation must be directly 
proportional to the injury. In addition, of course, assuming 
that every woman at some point in time was discriminated 
against, in a way which affected her job skills enough to 
warrant her deserving preferential treatment in the job mar-
ket, is assuming far too much. 
* * * * * 
Yet every woman has been the subject of some form of 
prejudice at some point in her life. Even if there are some 
women who have not been overtly down-graded, all women have 
experienced a lack of self-respect and a lack of confidence 
because of their lowered status in society. 
For where a community accepts that a person's ••• being 
a woman (is) right and proper grounds for denying that 
person full membership in the community, it can hardly 
be supposed that any but the most extraordinarily inde-
pendent woman will escape self-doubt. (Thomson, 1973: 
381) 
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Thus society owes females and would be remiss if it did not 
compensate them. (Thomson, 1973) 
However, why must the compensation for subjection to 
prejudice be in the form of jobs? To give a woman a job 
just because she is a female, that is a minimally competent 
female, will not increase her self-confidence, Rather, only 
if women believe that they are hired because of their abili-
ties and not merely because they are women will their collec-
tive self-confidence increase, 
Further, there are many women who have not been at all 
economically disadvantaged, in that they are daughters of 
wealthy or middle class parents. These women should not be 
given preference over white males who have had disadvantaged 
backgrounds. (Blackstone, 1975) 
On the other hand it has been argued that the advan-
taged would only be competing with the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged would only be competing with the disadvantaged. 
If the advantaged women were lowered by prejudice so much as 
to· compete only with the disadvantaged white male, then ob-
viously the advantaged woman has been discriminated against. 
(Boxill, 1978) 
It must be noted that this reasoning leaves many ques-
tions· unanswered. For instance, what of the advantaged white 
male who is now competing on the same level as the female 
applicant? By parallel reasoning, if the advantaged male were 
lowered to such a position then he must have been discrimi-
nated against in the past. In any case, the argument actually 
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considers only an idealistic world where a person's status 
as a job applicant is a direct result of her past advantages 
and naturally has the same status as others with similar ad-
vantages. Also, the argument does not consider the situation 
where a disadvantaged white male puts forth a great deal of 
effort and achieves the status of an advantaged woman who may 
have put forth little effort. The argument would automatically 
attribute the equality of status to past discrimination against 
the woman which would be, at best, jumping to conclusions. 
* * * * * 
Against preferential hiring, there is the argument that 
if preferential hiring is put into effect because women have 
been discriminated against in the past, then the same thing 
must be done for other minorities as well. Even WASP's may 
be considered a minority. In actuality there is no majority 
in the United States. Additionally, having different minor-
ity groups compete against one another in order to receive 
preferential hiring would result in producing power struggles 
and popularity contests. (Newton, 1973) 
In the preceding argument, however, even though there 
was the claim that WASP's are a minority, there was no claim 
that WASP's as a group have been discriminated against. True, 
the United States is comprised of minority groups, but not all 
minorities have suffered discrimination. Further, among those 
who have, they have not suffered in equal amounts. The mere 
fact that a minority group has suffered discrimination does 
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not put it on the same level as all other minority groups 
and does not automatically justify preferential hiring of 
the members of the group. So the preceding argument against 
preferential hiring is unsound. But also, the reasons that 
it is unsound remind us that to claim that women have been 
discriminated against is not to claim that women have suf~ 
fered enough to warrant preferential hiring as compensation. 
* * * * * 
Judith Jarvis Thomson compares the situation of females 
to that of veterans trying for civil service jobs. Both 
should be preferred because of what society owes them. If 
a woman, who has had a feminist upbringing, encouragement to 
achieve and has been raised in an upper-middle class family, 
gets a job before a poor struggling applicant, could this be 
considered unjust? Thomson maintains that it is as unjust 
as an unscarred upper-middle class veteran being preferred to 
a poor, struggling nonveteran. Even in a case where the can-
didate was hired at random, the poor, struggling man would 
lose out. In reality, any method of choosing candidates 
would have this result, other than one which chooses candi-
dates based upon the difficulty of their lives. (Thomson, 
1977) 
Yet it is easy to recognize Thomson's comparison as a 
weak one. I am here concerned with the case of a veteran 
trying for a civil service job and getting preference for 
it only insofar as it can be seen as a case of compensatory 
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justice. The injured party is getting compensation by the 
injurer, which is directly proportional to the injury. Not 
every veteran is wounded in battle but many were taken away 
from their jobs or job opportunities in order to serve the 
government. According to Thomson's reasoning, every male 
should be given preference for civil service jobs because 
males live with the fear that they may some day be drafted. 
Thomson does make a valid point, while almost contra-
dicting herself, that any method of choosing candidates, 
other than one based upon the difficulty of their lives, 
would have the effect of occasionally neglecting the fact 
that some of the candidates had disadvantaged pasts. But 
one, for the sake of practicality, cannot hire applicants, 
even adequately competent applicants, solely on the basis 
of how disadvantaged their backgrounds have been. Rather 
my view is that people should be hired on their qualifica~ 
tions alone; not because they have experienced some past 
privations. 
* * * * * 
As noted previously, a justification offered for pref-
erential hiring is that it may be regarded as a form of com-
pensatory justice. Females are regarded as the injured 
party and white males as the injurers. However, citing the 
"common sense principles," the claim has been made that the 
injurer is responsible to the injured party for the wrong 
that was committed. In response to the argument that women 
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who have been discriminated against in hiring situations in 
the past deserve compensation, but other women do not, the 
claim is made "(at best) the wrongdoer has an imperfect obli-
gation to compensate the group." (Bayles, 1973: 306) 
But this line of reasoning does not recognize the need . 
for the employer to have been part of any wrongdoing. To 
be sure, by being a member of the group which did the dis-
criminating, the employer, it might be said, was a member 
of the group which received the benefits. (Bayles, 1973) 
In saying that the group of employers who discriminated 
against female applicants received benefits, it should be 
noted that these employers may have been put at a disadvan-
tage as well. To have hired a white male when a female may 
have been more qualified for the job, in fact, may have had 
a negative effect upon the business. Even so, to say that 
one employer received benefits because he hired only white 
males is to say that other employers suffered because they 
did,not hire only white males and thus did not receive "bene-
fits".· Therefore, the fact that some employers received 
"benefits" for their discriminatory hiring practices, does 
not obligate all other employers to hire less qualified 
female applicants. Hence, non-discriminatory employers 
should not be obligated to compensate female applicants for 
the injuries-incurred to them by discriminatory employers. 
Nevertheless, even if the discriminatory employers de-
cided to compensate for their past practices and preferentially 
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hire women, is it the employer who is making the reparations, 
or is it actually the. white male applicant? 
* * * * * 
The claim has been made that preferential hiring does 
not penalize the white male applicant with superior qualifi-
cations. Even if he is not to blame for discriminatory prac-
tices of the past, since he has had more benefit from the 
discriminatory practices, it is fair that he relinquish his 
unfair advantage and compete on an equal level with appli-
cants who have been the object of past discrimination. (Sher, 
1975) 
It is obvious what benefits white male applicants have 
received from having been hired preferentially over females. 
However according to that argument, it is exactly these men, 
the ones who have already been hired, who should relinquish 
their unfair advantages. But it would be admittedly highly 
impractical to request that all the white males in the United 
States relinquish their unfair advantages, and give the jobs 
which they already hold to women. 
Even if there were a particular woman who had been dis-
criminated against in the past, the man who at present holds 
the job should not be obligated to give his job to her, even 
though he has been receiving the benefits of the employer's 
discriminatory hiring practices. For if the employer pref-
erentially hires a female applicant over a male applicant 
who has received the benefits of discrimination in the past, 
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the employer is still"acting unjustly. The white male appli-
cant may have benefitted from society, but he has done so in-
voluntarily, so he is not the one who owes compensation. 
(Fullinwider, 1975) 
The claim has been made that the white male should make 
reparations to females even when he may not have intentionally 
discriminated against women in the past. If society main-
tained and supported discrimination against women in the past, 
then society is obligated to compensate all women for the 
injustice. 
The issue of the justifiability'of reverse discrimina-
tion does not have to do with an individual's making up 
for his own acts of injustice against this or that 
person. (Taylor, 1973: 181) 
Thus preferential hiring is justifiable in that it rights "the 
wrongs committed as an integral part of an organized social 
practice whose very essence was to discriminate against women." 
(Taylor, 1973: 181) The victim of the past discrimination 
was the group of women since they became a collective object 
of an unjust institutionalized practice. Thus because an in-
stitutionalized injustice has occurred, an institutionalized 
compensation is required. Any man in the society has a duty 
to comply with and support the practice of preferential hiring 
which society has decreed. (Taylor, 1973) However it could 
,_,,, 
be that it was the unquestioned support of what society has 
decreed which could have caused discrimination against women 
to occur initially. 
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It must be noted that not all white males have directly 
benefitted from past discriminatory hiring practices. The 
white male applicant who,is in the job market for the first 
time has not received any such benefits. Actually it is the 
white male applicant who is the least likely to be receiving 
the benefits of discriminatory hiring practices• It is 
quite possible that he does not have a job, that is why he 
is applying for one. To assume that it is the white male 
applicant who is receiving the benefits of having been hired 
preferentially would be erroneous in many instances. True, 
the white male applicant may have been hired preferentially 
in the past, but, again, it would be unfair to assume that 
all white male applicants have benefitted in this way. In 
addition, as was mentioned previously, even if some white 
male applicants did benefit in this way, they did so in-
voluntarily. 
Against this argument, there is the claim that prefer-
ential hiring does not place the burden of compensation upon 
white males because the jobs which they have are not being 
taken away from them. Instead the white male is denied an 
equal opportunity for a job. This is not something which he 
gives,to women to compensate for his past deeds. Rather it 
should',be regarded as the community taking the opportunity 
from him to make amends to women. Jobs are the best form of 
compensation since that is what will best reinstate women's 
dignity and self-respect. So white males have to pay the 
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price since they have what society wishes to give to females. 
White males have had the advantages of self-respect and self-
esteem so they should be willing to let women have a chance. 
(Thomson, 1973) 
But, this practice does discriminate against the white 
male applicant because society is taking away his opportunity 
for a job so that society can make amends for its past in-
justices. As with the example of robbing Peter to pay back 
Pauline, the discrimination is merely reversed and is now 
against the white male applicant because of society's past 
mistakes. Again, it is not the white male applicants who 
have what women "are owed," but the white male jobholders. 
Therefore they are the ones who should compensate the women 
if anyone should. After all, it is the white male jobholder 
who is reaping the benefits of self-esteem and self-respect 
from his job. 
* * * * * 
The above criticisms of the main arguments for compen-
satory preferential hiring contain the following case against 
it, (Again, this paper addresses only the arguments for 
preferential hiring as a matter of compensatory justice, and 
no other. cases for or against preferential hiring.) Women 
who receive· the benefits of preferential hiring are often 
not the same women who received the initial hiring discrimi-
nation. Even if these women have in the past been discrimi-
nated against in some manner, that does not warrant their 
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being given preferential treatment in a hiring situation. 
Many groups have been discriminated against in the past and 
it would be virtually impossible to determine which appli-
cant has overcome the most hardships, even if every appli-
cant is a member of only one group, because many people are 
members of more than one group. Besides, an applicant's 
qualifications, not his or her underprivileged background, 
should determine his or her desirability as an applicant. 
If anyone needs to make compensations, the employers who 
formerly practiced hiring discrimination are the ones who 
should do so; but to do so through preferential hiring 
would merely serve to discriminate against the current white 
male applicants. 
Justice should be seen as "equal treatment under the 
law for all citizens." (Newton, 1973: 310) Thus injustice 
can be interpreted as discrimination for or against a group 
of citizens on bases other than those upon which they should 
be fairly judged. Therefore, preferential hiring can be 
equated with the original discrimination in a hiring situa-
tion against females. Both are forms of discrimination and 
both undermine the public equality which is granted by citi-
zenship and alter the grounds upon which choices among appli-
cants are made. (Newton, 1973) 
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